Local Candidates and Voter Mobilization: Evidence from Historical Two-Round Elections in Norway*

Jon H. Fiva † Daniel M. Smith‡

Online Appendix

Abstract

What effect do candidates with local ties have on voter turnout and party support? A considerable challenge within the existing literature on the personal vote, including that part which derives from local ties, is disentangling it from the party vote using observational data. We exploit the unique institutional context of Norway's historical two-round system, and data measured at the municipality level, to evaluate the mobilizational impact of voter attachment to parties versus (local) candidates. Under this system, entry into the second round was unrestricted, with the number and identity of candidates determined by elite coordination decisions. In municipalities where coordination at the district level between rounds resulted in the withdrawal of a candidate with local ties, we document a strong negative effect on both turnout and party support, which highlights the value of the personal vote for mobilization, and the potential trade-offs that confront parties and coalitions in nomination decisions.

*Manuscript accepted for publication at *Electoral Studies*. We thank Anna Gomez and Anna Menzel for data collection assistance, and José Cheibub, Gary Cox, Santiago Olivella, Steve Reed, Jo Saglie, Valentin Schröder, Yuki Takagi, and audience members at various workshops and conferences for helpful comments. Jon Fiva gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University, and the Centre for the Study of Equality, Social Organization, and Performance (ESOP) at the Department of Economics at the University of Oslo. ESOP is supported by the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence funding scheme, project number 179552.

†BI Norwegian Business School. E-mail: jon.h.fiva@bi.no

‡Harvard University, E-mail: danielmsmith@fas.harvard.edu

Table A.1: District Level Descriptive Statistics by Party

	1st Round			**2nd Round**		
Party	*Cand.*	*Votesh.*	*Seats*	*Cand.*	*Votesh.*	*Seats*
Labor Party (S)	0.895	0.250	42	0.835	0.247	29
Liberals (V)	1.194	0.363	97	0.886	0.363	133
Labor Democrats (A)	0.109	0.021	3	0.074	0.025	7
Coalition V / A	0.044	0.018	8	0.055	0.024	10
Conservatives (H)	0.135	0.032	5	0.063	0.014	4
Progressive Liberals (FV)	0.103	0.013	0	0.015	0.002	0
Coalition H/ FV	0.735	0.264	67	0.743	0.288	82
Church Party (KIR)	0.028	0.003	0	0.000	0.000	0
Farmers' Assoc. (L)	0.063	0.015	1	0.063	0.020	2
Temperance Party (T)	0.053	0.008	0	0.004	0.003	1
Various	0.057	0.014	0	0.033	0.015	4
Sum	3.408	1.000	223	2.768	1.000	272

Note: This table provides descriptive statistics based on election data from the period 1909-1918. All district-year observations are included for the first round (n=495). Only district-years where a second round was held are included for the second round (n=272). Cand. is the average number of candidates from each party running in a district, Votesh. the average share of votes, and Seats is the total number of seats won.

Table A.2: How the Number of Local Candidates Change Across Rounds By Party Bloc

	Change in Candidates					**N**
	-3	-2	-1	0	1	
A: All observations						
All parties combined ($\Delta Local$)	2	21	168	1184	10	1385
Labor Party ($\Delta Local^{S}$)			22	1362	1	1385
Liberals and Labor Democrats ($\Delta Local^{V/A}$)		6	94	1281	4	1385
Conservatives and Progressive Liberals ($\Delta Local^{H/FV}$)		3	55	1322	5	1385
Other ($\Delta Local^{OTH}$)			29	1353	3	1385
B: Conditional on 2nd round participation						
Labor Party ($\Delta Local^{S}$)			3	1068	1	1072
Liberals and Labor Democrats ($\Delta Local^{V/A}$)		4	76	1201	4	1285
Conservatives and Progressive Liberals ($\Delta Local^{H/FV}$)		2	36	957	4	999
Other ($\Delta Local^{OTH}$)			18	668	3	689

Note: Our empirical analysis is restricted to the 362 district-year observations spanning multiple municipalities for the four elections from 1909-1918. In 159 of these election districts, a candidate won an absolute majority of votes in the first round. A second round of elections was needed in the remaining 203 districts (comprising 1,385 municipalities). The descriptive statistics in this table are based on this sample. The party bloc category OTH contains KIR, L, T, and "Various" (cf. Online Appendix Table A.1).

Table A.3: Effect of Candidate Exit on Change in Turnout: Sample Split by Hometown Candidate Status in the Second Round

	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta Local^{S}$	0.064	0.078	0.045
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.053)
	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.039]
$\Delta Local^{V/A}$	0.023	0.040	0.032
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.014)
	[0.007]	[0.013]	[0.010]
$\Delta Local^{H/FV}$	0.022	0.040	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.024)
	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.016]
$\Delta Local^{OTH}$	0.030	0.036	0.042
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.026)
	[0.013]	[0.023]	[0.021]
N	1385	976	409
R^2	0.587	0.613	0.757
Hometown Candidate in 2nd Round	-	No	Yes

Note: The dependent variable is the difference between second and first-round turnout. Specification (2) is limited to cases where a hometown candidate did not *participate in the second round. Specification (3) is limited to cases where a hometown candidate* did *participate in the second round. All specifications include district-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the election district level in parentheses; regular heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in squared brackets.*

Table A.4: Effect of Candidate Exit on Change in Turnout: Sample Limited to Cases Where Bloc Participated in the Second Round

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta Local^{S}$	0.087	0.064	0.062	0.037
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.034)
	[0.020]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.028]
$\Delta Local^{V/A}$	0.016	0.030	0.023	0.026
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.009]
$\Delta Local^{H/FV}$	0.024	0.022	0.028	0.018
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)
	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.011]
$\Delta Local^{OTH}$	0.014	0.030	0.035	0.030
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)
	[0.014]	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.016]
N	1072	1285	999	689
R^2	0.541	0.571	0.611	0.641
Bloc Running in Second Round	S	V/A	H/FV	OTH

Note: The dependent variable is the difference between second and first-round turnout. Specification (1) is limited to the cases where the Labor bloc (S) participated in the second round. Specification (2) is limited to cases where the Liberal bloc (V/A) participated in the second round. Specification (3) is limited to cases where the Conservative bloc (H/FV) participated in the second round. Specification (4) is limited to cases where the Other bloc (OTH) participated in the second round. All specifications include district-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the election district level in parentheses. The within-district variation in the data is limited when we condition on second-round participation of the Labor bloc, effectively reducing the number of clusters. We, therefore, present regular heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in squared brackets.

Table A.5: Effect of Candidate Exit on Change in Fraction of Invalid Votes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$Margin$	-0.025	-0.027*	-0.027*	-0.028*	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
$Margin^2$	0.086	0.100	0.100	0.109*	
	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	
$\Delta Candidates$		0.001**	0.001**		
		(0.000)	(0.000)		
$\Delta Local$			-0.000		
			(0.001)		
$\Delta Candidates^S$				-0.000	
				(0.001)	
$\Delta Candidates^{V/A}$				0.001**	
				(0.001)	
$\Delta Candidates^{H/FV}$				0.001	
				(0.001)	
$\Delta Candidates^{OTH}$				0.000	
				(0.001)	
$\Delta Local^S$				0.002	0.001
				(0.001)	(0.001)
$\Delta Local^{V/A}$				0.000	0.000
				(0.001)	(0.001)
$\Delta Local^{H/FV}$				-0.002**	-0.003**
				(0.001)	(0.001)
$\Delta Local^{OTH}$				0.001	0.001
				(0.002)	(0.002)
N	1385	1385	1385	1385	1385
R^2	0.003	0.007	0.007	0.012	0.160
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
District-Year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes

Note: The dependent variable is the difference between second and first-round fraction of invalid votes. Standard errors clustered at the election district level in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.6: Change in Electoral Support and Change in Hometown Match: Sample Limited to Cases Where Bloc Participated in the Second Round

	(1) $\Delta Vote^{S}$	(2) $\Delta Vote^{V/A}$	(3) $\Delta Vote^{H/FV}$	(4) $\Delta Vote^{OTH}$
$\Delta Local^{S}$	**0.056**	-0.107	-0.009	-0.020
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.008)	(0.018)
	[0.033]	[0.030]	[0.010]	[0.016]
$\Delta Local^{V/A}$	-0.014	**0.048**	-0.030	-0.018
	(0.006)	**(0.013)**	(0.009)	(0.008)
	[0.005]	**[0.012]**	[0.009]	[0.007]
$\Delta Local^{H/FV}$	-0.014	-0.043	**0.075**	-0.017
	(0.007)	(0.014)	**(0.018)**	(0.009)
	[0.006]	[0.013]	**[0.016]**	[0.009]
$\Delta Local^{OTH}$	-0.006	-0.054	-0.092	**0.116**
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.031)	**(0.029)**
	[0.009]	[0.022]	[0.030]	**[0.030]**
N	1072	1285	999	689
R^2	0.504	0.514	0.499	0.773
Bloc Running in Second Round	S	V/A	H/FV	OTH

Note: The dependent variable is the change in municipality-level electoral support for the relevant bloc (given in the table heading) from the first to second round, divided by the total number of first-round voters. Specification (1) is limited to cases where the Labor bloc (S) participated in the second round. Specification (2) is limited to cases where the Liberal bloc (V/A) participated in the second round. Specification (3) is limited to cases where the Conservative bloc (H/FV) participated in the second round. Specification (4) is limited to cases where the Other bloc (OTH) participated in the second round. All specifications include district-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the election district level in parentheses. The within-district variation in the data is limited when we condition on second-round participation of the Labor bloc, effectively reducing the number of clusters. We, therefore, present regular heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in squared brackets.

Figure A.1: Electoral Support for Front-Runner in First Round



Note: The figure shows the share of votes obtained by the leading candidate in the first round of elections. The width of each bin is two percentage points. In 159 elections, a candidate won a majority of votes in the first round. A second round of elections was needed in the remaining 203 cases (N=362).

Figure A.2: Municipality Share of District Electorate Size



Note: The figure shows the share of each municipality's electorate relative to its parent district's electorate. The width of each bin is five percentage points (N=1385).

Figure A.3: Electoral Coordination at the Party Level



Note: The figure shows the number of rounds in which candidates participated, split by the candidates' within-party rank in the first round. The analysis is restricted to cases where electoral coordination across rounds was possible (i.e., a second round was held and more than one candidate from the relevant party participated in the first round).

Figure A.4: Electoral Coordination at the Bloc Level



Note: The figure shows the number of rounds in which candidates participated, split by the candidates' within-bloc rank in the first round. The analysis is restricted to the three dominant party blocs (S, V/A, H/FV) and cases where electoral coordination across rounds was possible (i.e., a second round was held and more than one candidate from the relevant bloc participated in the first round).

Figure A.5: Margin in First Round when a Second Round was Held



Note: The figure shows the difference in district-level vote shares obtained by the front-runner and runner-up in the first round. The width of each bin is one percentage point (N=203).