The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout*

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Abstract

A substantial body of research examines whether increasing the proportionality of an electoral system increases turnout, mostly based on cross-national comparisons. In this study, we offer two main contributions to the previous literature. First, we show that moving from a single-member district system to proportional representation in multi-member districts should, according to recent theories of elite mobilization, produce a contraction in the distribution of mobilizational effort across districts, and hence a contraction in the distribution of turnout rates. Second, we exploit a within-country panel dataset based on stable subnational geographic units before and after Norway’s historic 1921 electoral reform in order to test various implications stemming from the contraction hypothesis. We find significant support for the predictions of the elite mobilization models. (122 words)

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A substantial body of research examines whether increasing the proportionality of seat allocation rules in an electoral system increases voter turnout (e.g., Powell, 1980, 1986; Jackman, 1987; Blais and Carty, 1990; Ladner and Milner, 1999; Blais, 2006; Eggers, 2015). The verdict has been characterized in widely different ways, with some (e.g., Selb, 2009, p. 527) insisting that “evidence that turnout is higher under proportional representation (PR) than in majoritarian elections is overwhelming,” and others (e.g., Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey, 2014, p. 4) opining that the empirical results are “rather mixed.” In a meta-analysis of 14 studies, Geys (2006) reports that 70% of the estimated correlations between proportionality and turnout are significantly positive.

Most of the studies surveyed by Geys conduct cross-sectional analyses of aggregate turnout levels in a relatively small sample of industrialized democracies; two focus on subnational units, and a few include larger samples of countries. In this study, we offer two main departures from the previous literature.

First, we tie our predictions about the turnout effects of electoral systems to recent theoretical work on elite mobilization (Cox, 1999; Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey, 2014). This work predicts that a transition from single-member districts (SMDs) to multi-member districts with PR will produce two offsetting effects. In geographic units where the pre-reform SMDs were hotly contested, the introduction of PR will result in a decrease in competitiveness and turnout; in the less competitive pre-reform units, both will increase. Thus, the distribution of turnout will contract toward an intermediate level. Depending on how many pre-reform SMDs are hotly contested, mean turnout may increase or decrease.

Second, we exploit what is essentially a panel dataset—a series of observations on stable subnational geographic units before and after the 1921 Norwegian electoral system reform from a two-round runoff SMD system to a multi-member district PR system. Our within-country analysis allows us to avoid relying on cross-sectional comparisons that may be plagued by multiple confounds. Moreover, with our data, we can measure the competitiveness of each district before and after the switch to PR, which allows us to
test our predictions about the contraction effect of electoral reform on turnout.

We find substantial empirical support for the contraction effect predicted by the elite mobilization models: following the Norwegian reform, both competitiveness and turnout declined in the most competitive SMDs, falling toward the PR level, but increased in the non-competitive SMDs, rising toward the PR level. Aggregating across districts, mean turnout increased (because most of the pre-reform SMDs were non-competitive), while cross-district variance declined. Aside from a few observations made long ago by Gosnell (1930, p. 183) and Tingsten (1937, pp. 224-225), our study is the first to provide systematic empirical evidence of the contraction effect produced by reforming electoral systems from SMD to PR.

Proportionality and Turnout

Multiple studies using cross-national comparisons of advanced industrialized democracies have found that mean turnout is higher under PR electoral systems than under SMD systems (e.g., Powell, 1980; Blais and Carty, 1990; Franklin, 1996; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998). Within the set of industrialized democracies, the most widely acknowledged exceptions to the rule that turnout is higher under PR are Switzerland (relatively low turnout, despite PR) and pre-reform New Zealand (relatively high turnout, despite plurality rule). These exceptions suggest the importance of other variables or institutional arrangements—for example, the disaggregation of the electoral calendar (high in Switzerland, low in pre-reform New Zealand)—many of which are country-specific.¹

A few notable studies look at before-and-after evidence from within countries that experienced electoral reform. For example, Gosnell (1930) and Tingsten (1937) observe that aggregate turnout increased in Germany and Norway, respectively, following the adoption of PR. In a more recent study, Karp and Banducci (1999) find that turnout in

¹The relationship between proportionality and turnout is also less consistent in new and developing democracies (e.g., Pérez-Liñán, 2001; Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos, Power and Garand, 2004; Blais and Aarts, 2006; Gallego, Rico and Anduiza, 2012).
New Zealand increased following the switch from SMD to a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system in 1993.

A handful of other studies look at subnational variation within countries. For example, Ladner and Milner (1999) find that turnout is higher in Swiss cantons that use PR. Similarly, Bowler, Brockington and Donovan (2001) find higher turnout in U.S. municipalities that use cumulative voting rather than plurality rule. Eggers (2015) uses a regression discontinuity design applied to municipal elections in France—where towns with populations above 3,500 must use PR rather than a type of plurality system. He finds a slight (1 percentage point) increase in mean turnout under PR, and a lower level of variance in turnout across PR municipalities than across plurality-rule municipalities.

Three basic, and partially related, explanations have been advanced in the existing literature to explain higher turnout under PR (Blais and Carty, 1990). The first explanation is that, especially at higher levels of district magnitude, the translation of votes into seats is less distorted, thereby increasing voter feelings of efficacy. In a survey of voters before and after New Zealand’s electoral reform, for example, Banducci, Donovan and Karp (1999) find an increase in voters’ perceptions of the efficacy of their votes under the MMP system, especially among supporters of smaller parties.

A second explanation is that PR is more permissive to the entry of smaller parties (Duverger, 1954; Cox, 1997), so voters have less reason to abstain for lack of options matching their preferences (especially since they need be less concerned that their votes will be “wasted” on losing parties) (e.g., Powell, 1986; Jackman, 1987; Cox, 1997; Ladner and Milner, 1999). However, although many studies have found a relationship between PR and the number of parties entering competition (e.g., Cox, 1997; Eggers, 2015), the relationship between the number of parties and turnout has little to no empirical support (e.g., Brockington, 2004; Blais and Aarts, 2006; Grofman and Selb, 2011). This may be because more parties can lead to coalition governments and less clarity in voter choice (Jackman, 1987).

The third basic explanation is that PR elections tend to be more competitive (Jack-
man, 1987). Early rational choice work argued that close elections increase the chance that a single voter might become “pivotal” in determining the outcome, and thus increase voter turnout (Downs, 1957; Tullock, 1968; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). However, after the realization that these pivotal voter theories predict vanishingly small turnout rates in large electorates (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985), several scholars—beginning with Morton (1987, 1991) and Uhlaner (1989)—attempted to resolve the “paradox of voting” by focusing instead on the mobilizational efforts of politicians and interest groups (e.g., Cox and Munger, 1989; Aldrich, 1993; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999). The basic argument is that elite actors in close races might rationally invest in mobilizing voters, while those voters might rationally respond to such mobilization by turning out to vote.

Subsequent mobilization models, such as Cox (1999) and Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey (2014), have explored how elite incentives to mobilize are conditioned by electoral rules. In the next section, we make our own contribution to this literature by exploring the potentially heterogeneous effects of a PR electoral reform on turnout.

**Elite Mobilization and the Contraction Effect**

We use an elite mobilizational model based on Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey (2014) to consider the effect of a hypothetical reform from plurality rule in SMDs to “perfect” PR. The basic logic of the model is as follows: Imagine a situation where two parties, $A$ and $B$, compete for office, and voters come in two types, with a proportion $q$ supporting party $A$ and a proportion $(1-q)$ supporting party $B$. A party will increase its mobilizational effort as long as the marginal benefit to doing so (an expected increment in seats) outweighs the marginal cost (resources expended). The cost of mobilization is assumed to be some convex function of mobilizational effort. The benefits of increased effort depend on (i) how effort translates into votes, and (ii) how votes translate into seats—i.e., the electoral rule (Cox, 2015).

In a plurality-rule SMD system, when the electorate is not evenly split ($q \neq 1/2$) the
ex-ante leading party is the ex-post leading party in equilibrium.\textsuperscript{2} In such contests, the probability that an additional vote will be pivotal in determining the election result will decline rapidly in large populations of voters. This will discourage any mobilizational effort by elites to get out the vote. However, if the electorate is evenly split \((q = 1/2)\), pivot probabilities decline more slowly with the expected number of voters, and the marginal benefit of mobilizational effort to party \(A\) (or \(B\)) is higher.

In the perfect PR case, the marginal benefit of raising the level of mobilization depends less on \(q\). Regardless of the breakdown of partisan preferences in a given district, each additional vote for party \(A\) yields a positive finite increase in the expected seats for party \(A\). Putting these results together, Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey (2014) show that an SMD system induces higher turnout if and only if the election is expected to be close; PR induces higher turnout than SMD systems in less competitive races.

Following this reasoning, we can explain the contraction effect produced by electoral reform from SMD to PR with some additional notation. Let \(A\) and \(B\) compete in pre-reform SMDs of equal size, indexed by \(j = 1, ..., J\). Denote the expected margin of victory in a pre-reform district \(j\) by \(M_{j,\text{pre}}\); the expected level of mobilizational effort by each party by \(E_{j,\text{pre}}\); and the expected turnout of voters in district \(j\) by \(T_{j,\text{pre}}\). After the transition to PR, let \(M_{j,\text{post}}\) denote the margin of victory in the PR district which contains pre-reform district \(j\). Let the expected level of mobilizational effort in the area corresponding to pre-reform district \(j\) be \(E_{j,\text{post}}\) and the expected turnout be \(T_{j,\text{post}}\).

Initially, we can think of the PR system as collapsing all \(J\) pre-reform SMDs into a single \(J\)-seat nationwide district, with the allocation of seats based on some method of PR.\textsuperscript{3} We shall also imagine that the party system remains fixed (just two parties), and that voters’ preferences for the two parties also remain fixed. Finally, we imagine that year-specific influences on turnout, such as rainfall affecting the cost of voting, are

\textsuperscript{2}Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey (2014) also consider an “underdog compensation effect,” namely, that supporters of the party that is expected to lose will exhibit higher turnout rates than supporters of the party that is expected to win. If the underdog compensation effect is only “partial,” then it will not fully compensate for the ex-ante advantage of the leading party.

\textsuperscript{3}For the purposes of the model, the seat allocation formula under the PR system (e.g., D’Hondt, Sainte-Lagué, etc.) is not important.
comparable before and after reform.

With these assumptions, the Herrera-Morelli-Palfrey model predicts that the distribution of expected margins of victory across the SMD areas $j = 1, \ldots, J$ will contract following reform. For example, if there is zero underdog compensation, then $M_{j,pre} = |2q_j - 1|$. Meanwhile, $M_{j,post} = M$ for all $j$ under nationwide PR. We shall denote this post-reform margin by $M_{PR}$, and define it as the smaller of the following two positive numbers—(a) how many votes party $A$ would need to gain, in order to gain another seat (in the nationwide PR district); and (b) how many votes party $B$ would need to gain, in order to gain another seat—expressed as a share of all votes cast. With some mild assumptions about the pre-reform SMDs—viz., $\min\{q_j\} < 1/2 < \max\{q_j\}$ and $q_j = 1/2$ for some $j$—it follows that $0 = \min\{M_{j,pre}\} < M_{PR} < \max\{M_{j,pre}\}$. In other words, margins in the SMDs can vary widely, from razor-thin in the swing districts to wide in the safe districts; but there is only one margin after the transition to nationwide PR, and it will be intermediate between the pre-reform margins experienced in the swing and safe districts. The model thus predicts a contraction of competitiveness when a system reforms from SMD to PR:

- (C1) Competitiveness in the most competitive pre-reform SMDs (for which $M_{j,pre} < M_{PR}$) will decrease toward the post-reform level, $M_{PR}$.

- (C2) Competitiveness in intermediate pre-reform SMDs (for which $M_{j,pre} = M_{PR}$) will remain at the post-reform level, $M_{PR}$.

- (C3) Competitiveness in non-competitive SMDs (for which $M_{j,pre} > M_{PR}$) will increase toward the post-reform level, $M_{PR}$.

Note that the further a pre-reform district’s margin is from the post-reform level, the bigger its adjustment in expected competitiveness will be.

When pre- and post-reform years are otherwise comparable, we can characterize changes in mobilization and turnout as follows. First, in sufficiently competitive pre-reform SMDs—those for which $M_{j,pre} < M_{PR}$—expected pre-reform mobilization and
turnout will be higher than in the same area post-reform. That is, $E_{j,\text{pre}} > E_{j,\text{post}}$ and $T_{j,\text{pre}} > T_{j,\text{post}}$. The intuition is that mobilization is driven by how close the contest is (or is expected to be). In the pre-reform era, district $j$ may be a “swing” seat closely contested by the two parties and thus heavily mobilized. After the reform, the parties’ incentives to mobilize in the same area will hinge on how close the contest is for the last-allocated seat in the nationwide district (Selb, 2009). While that last-allocated seat will typically be closely contested, given nationwide PR, expected margins in swing SMDs will be even smaller (C1). Second, in pre-reform SMDs such that $M_{j,\text{pre}} = M_{PR}$, the expected mobilization and turnout levels will be the same before and after reform. That is, $E_{j,\text{pre}} = E_{j,\text{post}}$ and $T_{j,\text{pre}} = T_{j,\text{post}}$. Third, in all other pre-reform SMDs—those for which $M_{j,\text{pre}} > M_{PR}$—expected pre-reform mobilization and turnout will be lower than in the same area post-reform. That is, $E_{j,\text{pre}} < E_{j,\text{post}}$ and $T_{j,\text{pre}} < T_{j,\text{post}}$.  

Putting these three predictions together, the elite mobilization model also predicts a contraction effect on turnout in the pre-reform SMDs toward the post-reform level:

- **(T1)** Turnout in competitive pre-reform SMDs (for which $M_{j,\text{pre}} < M_{PR}$) will decrease toward the post-reform level, $T_{PR}$.
- **(T2)** Turnout in intermediate pre-reform SMDs (for which $M_{j,\text{pre}} = M_{PR}$) will remain at the post-reform level, $T_{PR}$.
- **(T3)** Turnout in non-competitive SMDs (for which $M_{j,\text{pre}} > M_{PR}$) will increase toward the post-reform level, $T_{PR}$.

Note that the further a pre-reform district’s margin is from the post-reform level, the larger its adjustment in expected turnout will be.

We should also note that the turnout contraction effect can be obscured when pre- and post-reform years differ systematically. For example, suppose the introduction of PR

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4 We do not directly measure mobilization. However, in a recent study, Rainey (2015) makes a similar argument that mobilization will be higher in competitive SMDs than under PR, and finds some cross-national survey evidence (measured as candidate contact) to support the argument.
coincides with a large uniform reduction in the cost of voting. In this case, a hotly contested pre-reform district should experience a decline in expected margin and, hence, in mobilizational effort. Yet, this decline in mobilization would be offset by the concomitant decline in voting costs. A large enough decline in costs would mean that even the most closely contested pre-reform districts might exhibit a turnout increase. Whether shifts in the cost of voting (or other year-specific effects) swamped the turnout contraction effect in Norway is an empirical issue on which our results below will shed some light. The theoretical point is just that, when year effects are unchanged, we should observe a contraction of competitiveness and turnout toward the PR level.

The model also yields two predictions about aggregate turnout effects:

- (A1) Nationwide mean turnout will decrease if the fraction of competitive pre-reform SMDs, $\kappa$, exceeds a threshold $K$; will remain the same if $\kappa = K$; and otherwise will increase.

- (A2) The cross-SMD variance in turnout will decrease, as long as $\kappa \in (0,1)$.

The first prediction (A1) is a straightforward consequence, although one cannot predict the precise value of $K$. The intuition of (A2) is that, under PR, the areas corresponding to the previous SMDs are all equally competitive post-reform ($M_{PR}$). Their competitiveness is determined by the contest for the last-allocated seat in the nationwide district in which they all reside. Other time-invariant turnout-relevant features of these areas are held constant. Thus, we expect a reduction in post-reform variance.

The variance reduction hypothesis (A2) has been previously articulated by Cox (1999) and empirically investigated by Selb (2009) and Eggers (2015). We hope to contribute to this growing line of investigation. Note, however, that our contraction hypothesis is sharper than the variance reduction hypothesis which it entails. First, a reduction in variance does not imply a contraction. It would be possible, for example, for the tails of the distribution of turnout to pull in, leaving the middle of the distribution unaltered. This would produce a reduction in variance but would not be consistent
with the contraction hypothesis. Second, if the contraction hypothesis is valid, then one should be able to identify a “contraction point” (a specific turnover rate) and show that the further away from this turnover rate a district was prior to reform, the more it contracts toward that level post-reform. For safe districts \( (M_{j,\text{pre}} > M_{PR}) \), the larger \( M_{j,\text{pre}} \) is, the bigger the increase in competitiveness and hence in expected turnout. For hotly contested districts \( (M_{j,\text{pre}} < M_{PR}) \), the smaller \( M_{j,\text{pre}} \) is, the bigger the decrease in competitiveness and hence in expected turnout. This implies that, if we regress the change in turnover in the area corresponding to a pre-reform district on that area’s pre-reform margin, we should find a positive coefficient—a prediction we test in Section 6.2.

Our Empirical Case: Norway, 1909-1927

From 1906 to 1918, members of the Norwegian Storting (parliament) were elected in SMDs with a two-round runoff system. If a candidate secured a majority of votes in the first round, he or she would be elected. Otherwise, a second round was held in which the candidate with a plurality of votes would get the seat. The runoff system was unusual in that there were no restrictions on candidate entry in the second round—even a candidate who did not compete in the first round could do so in the runoff. The average number of candidates competing in the first and second round was 3.4 and 2.8, respectively (Fiva and Smith, 2015).

Male suffrage (for those 25 years and above) was implemented in 1898. Female suffrage was gradually extended during the first decade of the 20th century, and universal suffrage was implemented in 1913. With the expansion of suffrage, support for the socialist Labor Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti) increased, but the SMD system resulted in the party’s consistent under-representation. In part as a strategy of socialist “containment” similar to the pattern in many other European democracies in the early 20th

\[5\] This does require unchanging year effects from before to after reform.

\[6\] The voting age was lowered from 25 to 23 in 1920.
century (Rokkan, 1970; Boix, 1999; Blais, Dobrzynska and Indridason, 2005), the non-socialist parties in the Norwegian parliament conceded in 1919 to change the electoral system to a multi-member PR system using the D’Hondt seat allocation formula. Our empirical analysis is based on four parliamentary elections preceding this reform (1909, 1912, 1915, and 1918) and three elections following the reform (1921, 1924, and 1927). Our primary aim is to quantify how the electoral reform affected voter turnout in the short run. The 1918 and 1921 elections are therefore of particular interest, but we will explore alternative specifications in Section 7.

Table 1 summarizes the key differences between the electoral reform assumed in our theoretical model and the electoral reform experienced in Norway. We can think about extending the predictions (C1)-(C3) and (T1)-(T3) for plurality rule to two-round runoff with the aid of two assumptions. Assumption 1 is that second-round contests are at least as closely contested as a counterfactual plurality contest in the same district would have been. This assumption seems reasonable because second-round contests occur only if there is enough competition to force a second round. Thus, second-round elections should be particularly likely to be “competitive” for purposes of prediction. Assumption 2 is that first-round contests that someone wins are no more closely contested than a counterfactual plurality contest in the same district would have been. This seems

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7See also Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) for an alternative explanation. In addition to Norway, Austria (1907-19), France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands (apart from urban districts), and Switzerland (three-rounds until 1900) also switched from two-round systems to PR. Belgium, Luxembourg, and the urban districts of the Netherlands switched from multi-member runoff systems to PR. Denmark, Iceland, pre-independence Ireland, Spain, and Sweden switched from single-round plurality to some form of PR (Boix, 1999).

8See Aardal (2002) for a detailed overview. In the 1930 to 1945 period, parties could team up into joint electoral cartels (listeforbund). Voters would cast their votes for the individual party lists, but the allocation of seats was based on the total sum of votes cast for the participating parties in the cartel. In 1953, the D’Hondt method was replaced by a Modified Sainte-Laguë seat allocation formula, which mechanically produces a more proportional seat allocation outcome (Fiva and Folke, 2016). Adjustment seats were introduced in 1989, further increasing the proportionality of the system.

9We exclude the 1906 election from our analysis due to the lower quality of data for that first election. We end our panel data set in 1927 to avoid complicating the analysis with the introduction of electoral cartels in 1930.

10The literature has not provided a full analysis of mobilizational incentives in two-round SMD elections. However, consistent with Assumption 1, several studies find that closer competition in the first round tends to result in increased turnout in the second round (Fauvelle-Aymar and François, 2006; Indridason, 2008; De Paola and Scoppa, 2014; Garmann, 2014), including in the case of Norway (Fiva and Smith, 2015).
reasonable since, if someone wins the first round, that same person would likely win the plurality contest; and the other candidates’ incentives to coordinate are thus relatively weak regardless of the electoral rules.

If these assumptions hold, then a contraction effect is weakly more likely when a country transitions from a two-round runoff system to PR than when it transitions from a single-round, plurality-rule system to PR.\textsuperscript{11} If both assumptions are reversed, then contraction is more likely to be observed in plurality-to-PR reforms than in runoff-to-PR reforms. Finally, if exactly one assumption is false, then we can no longer say which kind of reform is more likely to generate a contraction (but we can still say that a contraction is theoretically possible under both).

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<td><strong>Model</strong></td>
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<td>Pre-reform</td>
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<td>Number of Parties</td>
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<td>Number of Districts</td>
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<td>District Magnitude</td>
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<td>Seat Allocation Method</td>
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The maps in Figure 1 show the pre-reform SMD and post-reform PR district boundaries. In the 1909, 1912, and 1915 elections, there were 123 SMDs. In 1918, three additional districts were established. After the electoral reform, the total number of seats increased from 126 to 150. At the same time, the number of districts was reduced from 126 to 29. Our analysis is based on municipality-level election data provided by Statistics Norway. In the period we study, about 700 municipalities existed. Since municipalities map into SMDs, and SMDs map into PR districts, these data allow us to construct a panel data set covering the 1909-1927 period based on the pre-reform district structure, shown in the left panel of Figure 1.

Most of the SMDs covered multiple municipalities. However, the most populous municipalities contained multiple SMDs. The capital, Oslo (Kristiania), for example, contained five SMDs. Since we only have post-reform election outcomes measured at the

\textsuperscript{11}This assumes that we use final-round turnout as, in fact, we do.
municipality level, we exclude 19 SMDs that did not encompass the entire municipality. In addition, we exclude all districts that did not contain the same set of municipalities over the entire pre-reform period (12 SMDs), and districts that contained municipalities that ended up in separate multi-member districts after reform (3 SMDs). Our final data sample is a balanced panel of 92 units covering 7 elections. The 92 units map into 22 post-reform PR districts.\textsuperscript{12}

An editorial in the conservative \textit{Aftenposten} newspaper on the day of the 1921 election illustrates that elites were well aware of the new mobilizational incentives under PR, including the need for secondary mobilization: “In today’s election, all votes count equally no matter where in the city [Oslo/Kristiania] they are cast. The city is now one electoral

\textsuperscript{12}In our sample, the average electorate population increases from 9,168 to 48,765 between 1918 and 1921. The average number of eligible voters per Storting representative remains, however, quite stable (8,540 in 1921).
district and not five, as previously. It is necessary that all people who share our opinion, east and west, head to the polls. Moreover, it is not enough that every one of you vote, you should also encourage all the people you know to do the same.” Additionally, the newspaper reminded readers to “vote today, and only today—there is no runoff!”

Based on the elite mobilization models and the contraction effect discussed above, we expect to observe heterogeneous effects on turnout at the district level depending on the competitiveness of pre-reform districts: very competitive pre-reform districts should experience a decrease in competitiveness (C1) and turnout (T1) following reform, while less competitive districts should either experience no effect (C2; T2), or an increase in competitiveness (C3) and turnout (T3). At the aggregate level, we expect mean turnout to increase as long as safe districts are sufficiently common in the pre-reform period (A1) and variance to decrease (A2). We begin our empirical analysis with these aggregate-level predictions, as they are the most straightforward.

Aggregate Effects

We measure voter turnout by the ratio of approved votes to eligible voters in the final round. In other words, for the pre-reform period, we use the second-round turnout if two rounds were held, otherwise we use first-round turnout. In our sample, 45% of elections were decided in the first round. For the post-reform period, there is only one round of voting.

Figure 2 shows kernel density plots of voter turnout before (solid line) and after (dashed line) the electoral reform.13 Mean voter turnout was 60% in the pre-reform period and 65% in the post-reform period. This indicates that the fraction of competitive pre-reform SMDs $\kappa$ was below the theoretical threshold $K$ at which the introduction of PR would actually result in a decrease in aggregate turnout.

The box-and-whisker plots in Figure 3 illustrate the distribution of voter turnout over

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13 As noted before, turnout is measured at the SMD level both before and after reform. Online Appendix Figure A.1 shows cross-sectional distributions for turnout by election year.
Figure 2: Kernel Density Plot of Voter Turnout, Pre- and Post-Reform

Note: The figure shows separate kernel density plots (Epanechnikov kernel with optimal bandwidth) of voter turnout in the pre- and post-reform period. Two-round elections were used from 1909-1918, proportional representation from 1921-1927. The data set is based on the pre-reform district structure.
time in the 7 elections in our sample. Together, Figure 2 and Figure 3 give clear support for the predictions that PR increases mean turnout (A1) and decreases cross-district variance (A2). Focusing on the two elections immediately before and after the reform, we find that mean turnout increased from 58% in 1918 to 65% in 1921, and the standard deviation of turnout fell from 15 percentage points to 9 percentage points.

Figure 3: Voter Turnout 1909-1927

Note: Box-and-whisker plots based on yearly district-level (final round) turnout. Two-round elections were used from 1909-1918, proportional representation from 1921-1927. The data set is based on the pre-reform district structure.

The Contraction Effect

The graphical analyses presented above support the aggregate-level predictions and provide visual evidence that the distribution of turnout contracted. In this section, we explore the contraction effect(s) in more detail.
Contraction of Competitiveness

To quantify competitiveness in the pre-reform period, we use the difference in vote shares of the front-runner and runner-up in the first round (\( \text{Margin}_{j,\text{pre}} \) in the following). \( \text{Margin}_{j,\text{pre}} \) is the empirical counterpart to \( M_{j,\text{pre}} \) from Section 3. In our sample, some districts were very competitive, others much less so. For example, 27 SMDs had an average \( \text{Margin}_{j,\text{pre}} \) below 10 percentage points across the four pre-reform elections, while 8 had an average \( \text{Margin}_{j,\text{pre}} \) above 30 percentage points.\(^{14}\)

Measuring competitiveness in the post-reform PR districts is more complicated (Blais and Lago, 2009; Grofman and Selb, 2009). Let \( g[j] \) denote the post-reform PR district into which pre-reform district \( j \) maps. We quantify \( \text{Margin}_{g[j]} \) as the minimal number of additional votes one party would have to win to gain another seat in district \( g \), divided by the total number of votes cast. \( \text{Margin}_{g[j]} \) is the same for all \( j \) units in \( g \). This measure is similar to that proposed by Blais and Lago (2009), except that they focus on raw votes, whereas our measure is standardized as the change in the share of votes that would be needed to change the seat allocation outcome in the district. This standardization is reasonable if we believe that parties employ economies of scale in mobilization rather than simply individual door-to-door contact strategies. The Aftenposten newspaper editorial presented above suggests that this belief is sensible in the Norwegian case.

Figure 4 plots the kernel density distribution of \( \text{Margin}_{j,\text{pre}} \) (solid line) and \( \text{Margin}_{g[j]} \) (dashed line). There is a clear contraction of the distribution in competitiveness with the switch to PR. The right tail of the competitiveness distribution pulls in substantially, while the left tail pulls in slightly.\(^{15}\) The mean margin of victory for the last allocated seat under PR is 3 percentage points, compared to 17 percentage points in the pre-reform SMDs. Figure 5 presents box-and-whisker plots to illustrate the distribution of compet-

\(^{14}\)Online Appendix Figure A.2 shows the frequency of observations by \( \text{Margin}_{j,\text{pre}} \). Measured in vote counts, the average first-round difference between the front-runner and the runner-up is 616. The median difference is 466.

\(^{15}\)Specifically, if we compare the pre-reform average margin to the post-reform average margin, 2 SMDs became less competitive, while 90 became more competitive. Comparing the 1918 margin to the 1921 margin, 11 SMDs became less competitive, while 81 became more competitive.
itiveness ($Margin_{j,pre}$ and $Margin_{g[j]}$) over time. Both figures indicate a contraction of competitiveness following reform, in support of predictions (C1)-(C3).

Figure 4: Kernel Density Plot of Margin, Pre- and Post-Reform

![Kernel Density Plot](image)

Note: The figure shows separate kernel density plots (Epanechnikov kernel with optimal bandwidth) of Margin in the pre- and post-reform periods. In the pre-reform period we measure margin by the percentage-point difference in vote shares obtained by the front-runner and runner-up in the first round. In the post-reform period, we measure margin as the minimal number of additional votes one party would have to win to gain another seat, scaled by the number of votes cast. The data set is based on the pre-reform district structure.

An alternative measure proposed by Grofman and Selb (2009) generalizes competitiveness in both SMD and PR districts as a weighted average (by party vote share) of each party’s worst-case-scenario incentives to mobilize in a district in order to gain (or not lose) a seat, based on vote share differences and normalized by the threshold of exclusion. Their generalized “index of competition” can range from 0 to 1. We prefer our measure for ease of interpretation, but present the pre- and post-reform competitiveness using the Grofman-Selb measure in Online Appendix Figure A.3; this figure also shows
Figure 5: Margin 1909-1927

Note: Box-and-whisker plots based on yearly district-level margin. In the pre-reform period we measure margin by the percentage-point difference in vote shares obtained by the front-runner and runner-up in the first round. In the post-reform period, we measure margin as the minimal number of additional votes one party would have to win to gain another seat, scaled by the number of votes cast. The data set is based on the pre-reform district structure.

...a clear contraction in competitiveness.\textsuperscript{16}

Contraction of Turnout

We now turn our attention to the contraction effect on turnout. Such an effect is already quite evident in Figure 2. Figure 6 shows how mean turnout developed over time for districts with different levels of $Margin_{j,pre}$. In the most competitive sextile of pre-reform districts (top-left panel), turnout decreased from 1918 to 1921 (from 69.0 to 67.7 percent). However, turnout increased in all remaining sextiles, with successively larger...

\textsuperscript{16}Specifically, if we compare the pre-reform and post-reform averages of the Grofman-Selb index of competition, 33 SMDs became less competitive, while 59 became more competitive. We thank Peter Selb for sharing the STATA code for calculating the measure.
increments observed in successively less competitive districts.

Figure 6: Mean Voter Turnout 1909-1927 - Split by Mean 1909-1918 Margin

Note: The figure shows the average district-level turnout rate by election year, split by electoral closeness in the 1909-1918 period. Electoral closeness is measured as the average difference in vote shares between the first-round front-runner (sometimes winner) and the runner-up in the 1909-1918 period. The top-left panel is based on districts belonging to the first quantile of the closeness distribution (the most competitive districts), the bottom-right panel is based on the sixth quantile of the closeness distribution (the least competitive districts). The other panels show the intermediate categories. The data set is based on the pre-reform district structure.

To analyze the district-level contraction effect more formally, we use a regression framework. Exploiting data from the two elections immediately before and after the electoral reform, 1918 and 1921, we estimate variants of the following equation:

\[ \Delta T_j = f(Margin_{j,pre}, Margin_{g[j],post}) + u_j \]  

(1)

where \( j \) is a pre-reform district under the SMD system and its geographic counterpart
under the PR system, and \( g[j] \) denotes the post-reform district to which \( j \) belongs. \( \Delta T_j \) measures change in voter turnout for \( j \) from 1918 to 1921. We relate this to the average first-round difference between the front-runner and runner-up in the pre-reform period, \( Margin_{j,pre} \), and the average minimum distance to a seat threshold in the post-reform period \( Margin_{g[j],post} \). This allows us to test the contraction hypothesis explicitly, and also allows us to investigate the threshold of \( Margin_{pre} \) (\( M_{j,pre} \) from Section 3) for which the predicted \( \Delta T \) turns negative.

Since pre-reform districts \((j)\) are nested within post-reform districts \((g[j])\), we allow for arbitrary correlation in the error term, \( u_j \), within post-reform districts by clustering at this level. Since the number of clusters are relatively few, we also present regular heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.

Table 2 provides the main results. Specification (1) is a simple linear regression relating \( \Delta T_j \) to \( Margin_{j,pre} \). This model fits the data remarkably well: 42.8% of the variation in \( \Delta T_j \) is explained by \( Margin_{j,pre} \). Adding a second order term to the model—cf. specification (2)—does not further increase the \( R^2 \). The point estimate of 0.65 suggests that a 10-percentage-point increase in \( Margin_{pre} \) (roughly corresponding to a standard deviation increase) increases \( \Delta T \) by 6.5 percentage points. The effect is highly statistically significant using both regular and cluster-robust standard errors, with \( t \)-values of about 7.\(^{17}\)

In specification (3), we control for the average post-reform margin in the PR district to which \( j \) belongs. This additional control does not affect the impact of the pre-reform margin. Moreover, using the Grofman-Selb measure of competitiveness instead of ours also leaves the effect of pre-reform margin unchanged (results omitted for brevity). As regards the effect of post-reform competitiveness on the change in turnout, specification (3) shows that SMDs belonging to less competitive PR districts (i.e., those having higher

\(^{17}\)Cluster-robust standard errors may be biased downwards if the number of clusters is “few.” Depending on the situation, “few” may range from less than 20 to less than 50 clusters (Cameron and Miller, 2015). In our application, we have 22 clusters. As an alternative, we therefore applied the resampling methods of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) when clustering at the post-reform district level. With this method, the estimated contraction effect remains highly statistically significant (\( p < 0.001 \)).
Table 2: Pre-Reform Margin and Change in Turnout

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Note: The dependent variable is the change in voter turnout from 1918 to 1921. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses, cluster-robust standard errors in squared brackets.

Post-reform margins) tend to have a lower $\Delta T$. Although the effect is statistically insignificant, this lack of significance is to be expected. Figure 4 shows there was very little variation across the PR districts in competitiveness. As the sample variance of any regressor declines, however, the analyst’s ability to detect its effects on any dependent variable necessarily declines (i.e., we lack statistical power). Consistent with this observation, we also cannot reject the null hypothesis that post-reform margins had just as much effect (in magnitude) as pre-reform margins.\(^{18}\)

Finally, in specification (4) we control in a more flexible way for post-reform competitiveness by including a set of fixed effects capturing the post-reform district structure. Hence, we are comparing changes in turnout for “SMDs” ending up in the same post-reform district. The post-reform fixed effects improve the model considerably (the $R^2$ is roughly doubled). The point estimate of interest, however, does not change much. It falls only moderately in comparison to our baseline estimate and is still highly statistically

\(^{18}\) That is, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on $Margin_{pre}$ equals the (absolute value of) the coefficient on $Margin_{post}$.
significant (t-value above 6).

Figure 7 graphically illustrates the relationship between $Margin_{pre}$ and $\Delta T$. The scatter points are the values for the 92 “SMDs” in our sample; the fitted line represents the predicted values for $\Delta T$ based on specification (1); the shaded area represents a 95% confidence interval of these predicted values. The dashed vertical line indicates the point at which the fitted line crosses the x-axis. In other words, specification (1) suggests that for a pre-reform SMD where $Margin_{pre} < 0.067$, the introduction of PR reduced voter turnout. This finding provides support for the theoretical argument advanced by Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey (2014) and the corresponding predictions (T1), (T2), and (T3) presented above, that the introduction of PR may have heterogeneous effects on turnout, depending on the competitiveness of the pre-reform SMDs.

Figure 7: Relationship Between Pre-Reform Margin and Change in Turnout

Note: This figure shows the relationship between the pre-reform margin and the change in turnout ($\Delta T$) based on a simple linear regression model. The fitted line shows the predicted values for $\Delta T$ and a corresponding 95% confidence interval using cluster-robust standard errors, in addition to the 92 scatter points. The dashed vertical line indicates the point at which the fitted line crosses the x-axis.
Sensitivity Analyses

Our research design is based on within-district changes in voter turnout. This design hinges on a fundamentally untestable parallel trend assumption (namely, that the change in SMD-level turnout from 1918 to 1921 due to “period effects” is independent of the degree of competitiveness). We can, however, shed some light on the plausibility of this assumption by estimating placebo contraction effects based on non-reform election years. Figure 8 graphically presents the results of such a falsification exercise. The bottom-left panel reproduces the actual contraction effect presented in Figure 7. The five other panels of Figure 8 are based on non-reform election years. The top-left panel, for example, relates the change in turnout from 1909 to 1912 to Margin$_{pre}$. Reassuringly for our identification strategy, there is no systematic relationship between $\Delta T$ and Margin$_{pre}$ in non-reform years. Hence, it seems plausible that in the counterfactual situation where the electoral reform did not happen, turnout would not have contracted.

Another possibility is that our results might be due to a change in the number of electoral parties. With the introduction of PR, the number of parties running for office increased from about three to about five (see Online Appendix Figure A.4). A concern might be that the number of parties (NoP) increased more in low competition areas, and that this increase is responsible for the observed change in turnout. If so, the mechanism through which PR increases turnout doesn’t go through increased competitiveness, but rather through increased options (parties) for voters. To explore this alternative explanation, we include $\Delta NoP$ as a control variable in our regression framework. Specification (1) in Table 3 shows that the estimated effect of $\Delta NoP$ is close to zero and statistically insignificant. In specification (2), we replace $\Delta NoP$ with $\Delta NoB$, the number of political blocs participating in the election (Left, Center, Right, Agrarian, Other), and find a small positive effect, statistically significant at the 5% level. The point estimate of 0.02 indicates that when one additional bloc is participating in the election, turnout increases by two percentage points. Importantly, however, the estimated effect of Margin is not
Figure 8: Falsification Test: Linear Regression Model

Note: The figure shows the relationship between the change in turnout and pre-reform margin based on simple linear regression models for each election year in our sample. The fitted lines show the predicted values for $\Delta T$ and corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals based on cluster-robust standard errors.
significantly altered when $\Delta NoP$ or $\Delta NoB$ are included in the model.\footnote{Over time, the switch to PR may have also motivated the creation of more centralized national parties with increased mobilizational capacity. Aggregate turnout may have also been affected by the extension of the franchise in 1913, as well as a public referendum banning alcohol consumption in 1919. However, these events—indeed, any events that pushed turnout more or less uniformly up or down—should simply adjust the threshold $M$. This might hinder our ability to detect the contraction effect, as discussed in the text above, but it cannot artificially generate one where none exists.}

Another potentially important mechanism relates to district magnitude. The post-reform PR districts vary in magnitude from three to eight. It is plausible that turnout may increase more in “SMDs” under PR that are part of districts with larger magnitude, as larger magnitude will increase the proportionality of the seat allocation results and potentially attract greater mobilization effort by party elites. To investigate this possibility, we include $\Delta Magnitude$ as a control variable in specification (3). The results in Table 3 show that the effect of this variable is close to zero and statistically insignificant.\footnote{We also tested models where $\Delta NoP$, $\Delta NoB$, and $\Delta Magnitude$, were interacted with $Margin$. These interaction terms were, however, always statistically insignificant, and results are omitted for brevity.}

Finally, we implement analyses with alternative operationalizations of $\Delta T$ and $Margin$. In specification (4), we use $Margin$ measured in 1918, rather than $Margin$ measured as the average in the pre-reform period. We find results similar to our baseline analysis, but we explain much less of the variation in $\Delta T$. In specification (5), we rely on the average pre-reform $Margin$ in the final round rather than the average pre-reform $Margin$ in the first round. The results are almost unaltered from our baseline analysis. In specification (6) we use first-round turnout rather than final-round turnout to measure $\Delta T$. Again, we find a positive and significant relationship between $\Delta T$ and $Margin$. The positive constant term suggests, however, that even the most competitive SMDs experienced an increase in turnout from 1918 to 1921 when we compare with the first-round turnout in the pre-reform period. Lastly, in specification (7), we use average turnout in the pre- and post-reform periods. Again, results are as in our baseline analysis.\footnote{Online Appendix Table A.1 replicates these specifications with post-reform PR district fixed effects. The results are largely unchanged.}
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Note: The dependent variable in columns (1) - (5) is the change in voter turnout from 1918 to 1921 using final-round turnout in the pre-reform period. The dependent variable in column (6) is the change in voter turnout from 1918 to 1921 using first-round turnout in the pre-reform period. The dependent variable in column (7) is the change in average voter turnout from 1909-1918 to 1921-1927 using final-round turnout in the pre-reform period. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses, cluster-robust standard errors in squared brackets.
Conclusion

Our investigation in this study has aimed to shed light on how strategic mobilization of voters differs under different electoral systems. Most existing studies of how electoral rules affect voter turnout have examined cross-sectional datasets and focused on mean turnout measured at the aggregate, national level. In other words, previous scholars have explored whether turnout tends to be higher on average in countries that use PR in multi-member districts than in countries that use SMDs.

However, recent theoretical models of mobilization illuminate more than just aggregate mean turnout. Elite mobilization theories of turnout make detailed predictions about how the closeness of competition, and thus turnout, should change at the district level when national electoral reforms are adopted. More specifically, these models predict that mobilizational incentives (hence turnout) will contract following the adoption of PR, falling in highly competitive pre-reform SMDs, but increasing elsewhere. The contraction hypothesis also predicts that the more a pre-reform SMD’s competitiveness diverges from the post-reform level, the more its competitiveness and turnout should contract toward that level post-reform. This implies that the change in turnout is a function of (primarily) the pre-reform margin of victory and (secondarily, due to low variance) the post-reform margin of victory.

We have exploited a rich new dataset on Norwegian parliamentary elections, before and after the major electoral reform from two-round runoff in SMDs to PR in multi-member districts, in order to provide the first systematic empirical assessment of the contraction hypothesis and the various predictions that flow from it. We find that the data fit the theory’s predictions quite well.

As is often the case, some areas for future research still remain. Broadly speaking, the incentive for elite actors to mobilize their supporters in legislative elections depends on what is at stake. The stakes always include the legislative seats themselves; however, other political offices—such as cabinet positions, committee chairmanships, and judi-
cial positions—will also be filled differently depending on the electoral outcome. Thus, elite incentives to exert mobilizational effort ultimately depend on “the translations from effort-to-votes, votes-to-seats, and seats-to-portfolios” (Cox, 1999, p. 387). Here, “portfolios” can be interpreted to include all important executive, legislative, and judicial posts at stake—directly or indirectly—in a particular election. A complete assessment of elite mobilizational incentives must take all three mappings, and interactions between them, into account (Cox, 1999; Herrera, Morelli and Nunnari, forthcoming).

We have focused in this paper on a major reform which changed the votes-to-seats mapping from two-round, plurality-rule runoff in single-member districts to proportional allocation in multi-member districts. However, the systematic reallocation of elite effort that we have documented in Norway’s electoral districts following the introduction of PR seems to have coincided with a shift in the technology of mobilization, from personal contacts to mass-media appeals and secondary mobilization strategies. Whether this change can be fully documented with additional historical data from Norway remains to be seen, but we believe that a promising area for future research concerns how electoral rules, and particularly electoral reforms, influence mobilizational tactics (and hence the effort-to-votes mapping).

Another promising area for future empirical investigation is how the seats-to-portfolios mapping affects turnout across districts within countries, or across countries with different institutional arrangements. Although our empirical investigation for Norway focuses on the immediate period after the electoral reform, the Norwegian case may provide some opportunities for future empirical inquiry in this area. Beginning in 1930, parties could join forces in joint electoral cartels (*listeforbund*). Votes were cast for the individual party lists, but seats were allocated first based on the total number of votes earned by participating parties in the cartel. Such an arrangement may increase the seats-to-portfolios mapping of mobilizational effort if it increases allied parties’ chances of getting into government. At the district level, individual politicians who anticipate an appointment to cabinet (or some other post-electoral reward) if their party wins power may also exhibit
differential rates of mobilizational effort. More research is needed to elucidate how such anticipations of the seats-to-portfolios mapping influence elite mobilization.

References


**Acknowledgments**

We thank Anna Gomez, Anna Menzel, Anthony Ramicone, and Ross Friedman for data collection assistance, and Ben Geys, Torben Iversen, and Emily Beaulieu for helpful comments. We also benefited from audience feedback at Harvard University, University of Bergen, University of Oslo, Statistics Norway, MPSA, and APSA. Jon Fiva gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University.

**Biographical Statement**

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Daniel M. Smith is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.
1 Online Appendix

Figure A.1: Cross-sectional Voter Turnout Distributions 1909-1927

Note: The figure shows the distribution of district-level voter turnout by election year. Two-round elections were used from 1909-1918, proportional representation from 1921-1927. The width of each bin is 5 percentage points. The level of observation is the pre-reform district structure (n=92).
Figure A.2: Frequency of Observations by Average Pre-Reform Margin

Note: The figure shows the average difference in vote shares obtained by the front-runner and runner-up in the first round. The width of each bin is 2.5 percentage points. The level of observation in the data is based on the pre-reform district structure (n=92).
Figure A.3: Kernel Density Plot of Index of Competition, Pre- and Post-Reform

Note: The figure shows separate kernel density plots (Epanechnikov kernel with optimal bandwidth) of the Grofman-Selb (2009) Index of Competition. The data set is based on the pre-reform district structure.
Figure A.4: Average Number of Parties Running 1909-1927

Note: The figure shows the average number of parties running in each election. Two-round elections were used from 1909-1918, proportional representation from 1921-1927. In the pre-reform period, the number of parties running in the first round is reported. The data set is based on the pre-reform district structure.
Table A.1: Sensitivity Analyses Based on Specifications with PR District Fixed Effects

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Note: The dependent variable in columns (1) - (4) is the change in voter turnout from 1918 to 1921 using final-round turnout in the pre-reform period. The dependent variable in column (5) is the change in voter turnout from 1918 to 1921 using first-round turnout in the pre-reform period. The dependent variable in column (6) is the change in average voter turnout from 1909-1918 to 1921-1927 using final-round turnout in the pre-reform period. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses, cluster-robust standard errors in squared brackets.